Accepting Collective Responsibility for the Future by Gardiner, Stephen M.
Journal of Practical Ethics
 STEPHEN GARDINER22
Accepting Collective Responsibility for 
the Future
Stephen M. Gardiner
University of Washington
AbStRACt
Existing institutions do not seem well-designed to address paradigmatically 
global, intergenerational and ecological problems, such as climate change. 1 In par-
ticular, they tend to crowd out intergenerational concern, and thereby facilitate a 
“tyranny of the contemporary” in which successive generations exploit the future 
to their own advantage in morally indefensible ways (albeit perhaps unintention-
ally). Overcoming such a tyranny will require both accepting responsibility for the 
future and meeting the institutional gap. I propose that we approach the first in terms 
of a traditional “delegated responsibility” model of the transmission of individual 
responsibility to collectives, and the second with a call for a global constitutional 
convention focused on future generations. In this paper, I develop the delegated re-
sponsibility model by suggesting how it leads us to understand both past failures and 
prospective responsibility. I then briefly defend the call for a global constitutional 
convention.
1.  Elsewhere, I analyze climate change a “perfect moral storm” that involves all these dimensions 
(and more). Here I focus on the intergenerational aspect. See Gardiner 2011a.
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I. WHERE ARE WE?
Design issues
In my view, humanity faces a serious problem of institutional design. this 
claim may initially seem radical. Yet it has resonance in climate circles, including oc-
casionally among leading figures in the political establishment. For instance, Mary 
Robinson, United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Envoy on Climate Change, 
former United Nations Human Rights Commissioner and former President of 
Ireland, once wrote about climate change (Robinson 2008):
“The scope of these problems – and of the action required to treat them – reach 
beyond previous human challenges. Yet in the sixteen years since the UNFCCC 
was signed, global negotiations have proceeded at a glacial pace. We have collec-
tively failed to grasp the scale and urgency of the problem. Climate change shows up 
countless weaknesses in our current institutional architecture.”
More bluntly, in the run up to the disastrous Copenhagen climate meeting in 
2009, Connie Hedegaard, then Danish Minister for Climate and Energy, and subse-
quently EU commissioner on climate action, quoted in Von bulow (2009), said:
“If the whole world comes to Copenhagen and leaves without making the needed 
political agreement, then I think it’s a failure that is not just about climate. Then 
it’s the whole global democratic system not being able to deliver results in one of the 
defining challenges of our century. And that … should not be a possibility.”
In essence, the problem is that currently dominant institutions do not appear 
well-suited for addressing serious, paradigmatically global, intergenerational and 
ecological problems, such as climate change.2
How do we explain these shortcomings? In my view, one of the main reasons is 
structural. Conventional institutions tend to be dominated by short-term concerns, 
2.  Some maintain that the Paris Agreement changes this situation. However, there remain sub-
stantial reasons for concern (e.g., Oxfam et al. 2015; Milman 2015; Anderson and Peters 2016), some of 
which echo my criticisms of previous agreements (Gardiner 2004; 2011a).
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to have an overly narrow focus on economic matters, and not to have been designed 
with global, intergenerational or ecological concerns in mind.3 Prominent examples 
of such institutions include market systems and national governments with three-to-
five year election cycles. Notably, in many contemporary societies these institutions 
have mutually reinforcing effects on each other, and also play major roles in shaping 
the incentives facing other institutions.
to some extent, the limitations of current institutions are predictable. First, 
there is a historical argument. Presumably, there is a strong tendency for the members 
of any generation to create, maintain and shape institutions that disproportionately 
deal with the concerns that face them, here and now, in the present. Consequently, 
it would not be surprising for the set of institutions that emerges over time to reflect 
this, and show a tendency to highlight perspectives or problems that substantially 
crowd out broader intergenerational concerns. Absent deliberate, sustained inter-
vention this would be just what one might expect, historically-speaking.
Second, there is a strategic argument. there is a clear temptation for each genera-
tion to behave badly with respect to the future. In doing so, it can secure benefits for 
itself and avoid bearing costs, in ways that seem morally unjustified. Consider two 
clear threats: the tyranny of the contemporary, and the problem of moral corruption.
the first threat is a general ethical challenge that I call the tyranny of the contem-
porary. to see the worry more clearly, consider a simple (and highly idealized) model. 
First, imagine a sequence of nonoverlapping generations. Second, suppose that each 
generation must make decisions about goods that are temporally dispersed. One type 
—‘front-loaded goods’— are such that their benefits accrue to the generation that 
produces them, but their costs are substantially deferred and fall on later generations. 
Another type —‘back-loaded goods’—are such that their costs accrue to the genera-
tion that produces them, but their benefits are substantially deferred and arise to later 
generations. third, assume that each generation has preferences that are exclusively 
generation-relative in scope: they concern things that happen within the timeframe of 
its own existence (Gardiner 2015).
In such a situation, each generation has some reason to engage in “buck passing”. 
It can secure benefits for itself by imposing costs on its successors, and avoid costs 
to itself by failing to benefit its successors. Moreover, absent other factors (such as 
3.  Note that I argue only that this is one of the main reasons. Other issues, such as the embedded 
power of fossil fuel interests and other defects of existing institutions in representing current people, 
also play a considerable role.
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moral convictions) this reason may be decisive. Since any given generation is (by hy-
pothesis) concerned only with what happens during its own time, it has a standing 
concern for intragenerational benefits and costs, but no obvious concern for inter-
generational costs and benefits. buck-passing is thus the default position.
Other things being equal, intergenerational buck-passing raises serious ethical 
questions. As a matter of substance, each generation is likely to oversupply front-
loaded goods and undersupply back-loaded goods relative to reasonable ethical 
norms.4 this is clearest in the case of the oversupply of front-loaded goods. It seems 
unethical for an earlier generation simply to foist costs on a later generation with no 
consideration for its interests: for instance, without any compensation and without 
its consent. However, it is also relevant to the undersupply of back-loaded goods. On 
the (modest) assumption that, other things being equal, any given current generation 
has an obligation to engage in at least some back-loaded projects, then each genera-
tion will fail in its duties to the future if it does not invest in such projects.
the challenge posed by intergenerational buck-passing is also serious from a 
relational point of view. Later generations are subject to the arbitrary and apparent-
ly unaccountable power of earlier generations. this raises basic ethical questions, 
including questions of fairness, exploitation, domination and political legitimacy.5 
For example, elsewhere I argue that we should worry that buck-passing sometimes 
amounts to intergenerational extortion (Gardiner and Weisbach 2016, ch. 4; Gardiner 
2017a).
the substantive and relational worries are unsettling enough when considering 
buck-passing by a single generation. However, this is only one part of the problem. 
First, in a typical tyranny of the contemporary, there is iteration. the temptation of 
buck-passing arises for each subsequent generation as it faces decisions about what 
to do about temporally dispersed goods. Consequently, the threat is often played 
out over many generations. Second, this iteration threatens accumulation: severe and 
catastrophic outcomes become more likely as the effects of ongoing buck-passing ac-
cumulate in the futher future. third, this may also lead to escalation of the moral 
problem. As future effects accumulate, they place pressure even on otherwise decent 
4.  In this paper, I do not defend a particular view on the content of these norms. My aim is to 
present the problem at a higher level of abstraction, in a way which can accommodate a wide variety 
of possible views about that content. I will, however, tend to presuppose that our responsibilities to 
future generations are significant, and that the past 25 years of international climate policy constitute 
a prima facie failure to meet those responsibilities.
5.  See, e.g., bertram 2009; Nolt 2010; Smith 2013. (N.b. I disagree with Smith’s characterization of 
my intergenerational storm.)
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later generations to engage in buck-passing behavior. In particular, a later generation 
faced with severe impacts may (correctly) feel licenced to impose otherwise unaccept-
able burdens on the further future through a right to self-defense. As a result, taken 
to extremes, a tyranny of the contemporary threatens a dangerous downward spiral 
in social conditions, material and ethical.
the second clear threat—the threat of moral corruption—is related. the temp-
tation to pass the buck to the future puts pressure on the ways in which we think and 
talk about issues in the real world, encouraging us to accept framings that distort our 
perceptions of moral reality. Specifically, the tyranny of the contemporary threatens 
to infect our framing of problems, and the theoretical “solutions” that attract us, in 
ways which facilitate intergenerational buck-passing. Most obviously, we can misdi-
agnose issues in ways which obscure their intergenerational dimensions.
Elsewhere I have argued that this threat is manifest in the climate case. For in-
stance, the traditional framing of the climate problem in international relations and 
economics involves nation states facing a conventional prisoner’s dilemma, or tragedy 
of the commons scenario. though each government recognizes that it is in the collec-
tive interest of all countries to cooperate to restrict emissions rather than not, each 
also believes that it is in the individual interest of its own country to defect from the 
cooperative outcome. Since all think the same, they all defect, with the result that all 
suffer. On the traditional view, then, the problem is one of self-inflicted, self-destruc-
tive behavior.
I find this view overly optimistic. For one thing, the traditional framing typically 
assumes that the government of each state reliably represents the interests of its own citizens 
in perpetuity, or at least for many generations into the future. Often this assumption is 
implicit, and so goes unnoticed. Yet once identified it strikes me as deeply unrealistic. 
Indeed, arguably, it is so far-fetched that it does not even pass an initial “laugh test” 
of minimal plausibility. the traditional argument is thus “a wolf in sheeps’ clothing”.6
For another thing, the traditional view struggles to account for the depth of the 
failure of past climate agreements, such as Kyoto and Copenhagen. In my view, it 
is more plausible to think that the defections of governments from serious climate 
action have nothing to do with the long-term intergenerational interests of their 
own people, and everything to do with the narrower concerns of the present. If this 
is correct, the failures of the past do not amount to “self-inflicted and self-destruc-
6.  Note that I am not claiming that all would be well if the laughable assumption turned out to be 
true.
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tive” behavior, but instead involve current actors inflicting risks of severe harm that 
fall disproportionatly on future generations (including of their own people), other 
countries, and nonhuman nature. In disguising this, the traditional tragedy of the 
commons analysis is seriously deceptive, and the tyranny of the contemporary closer 
to the truth.7
Prospects
It is tempting to think that the tyranny of the contemporary is such a deep 
problem that it cannot be overcome: that our prospects are hopeless. Yet this conclu-
sion would be too quick. One way to see this is to notice that there are multiple po-
tential drivers of such a tyranny, and they have different implications (Gardiner 2014, 
pp. 302-303). Specifically, the assumption in the previous illustrative model was that 
“each generation has preferences that are exclusively generation-relative in scope: they 
concern things that happen within the timeframe of its own existence”. However, 
there are various ways to interpret this assumption, and also less stringent assump-
tions that would create less pure, but still recognizable, versions of a tyranny of the 
contemporary. Consider three prominent examples.
the first, most obvious assumption, is generational ruthlessness: each genera-
tion is concerned only with its own interests, narrowly construed, and is indifferent 
to all other concerns, including notably those of future generations and the rest of 
nature. Some theorists in international relations talk as if something like ruthless-
ness is true, at least at the level of nation states. Specifically, they think that states 
act only for the sake of their own national interest, fairly narrowly defined. As noted 
above, such theorists often (implausibly, to my mind) assume that states pursue their 
own national interest understood in a robustly intergenerational way.8 Generational 
ruthlessness is a harsh assumption. Nevertheless, even it does not imply that all is 
hopeless. After all, many mainstream strategies to convince current people to act on 
global environmental problems attempt to do so by showing them that (contrary to 
their initial impressions) such action is in their (typically short-term and economic) 
interests. the thought is that “green is good, for us (as well as for them)” and this is 
7.  My diagnosis has proven to have considerable explanatory power over time. See Gardiner 2001; 
2004a; 2006, 2011a; 2017b.
8.  See also, Gardiner and Weisbach 2016, ch. 3.
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sufficient to drive action. this thought is made plausible by facts such as the falling 
price of renewables, and the indirect costs of fossil fuel consumption (e.g., to health).
Still, such “win-win” approaches have a notable weakness: they are hostage to 
fortune in notable ways. Most obviously, if it turns out not to be true that “going 
green” is in the short-term economic interest of current people (and especially maxi-
mally in their interests compared to other, browner options), the strategy of accom-
modating ruthlessness has nothing to say. Less obviously, the bar here is set very high 
and so not only accommodates, but also encourages extortion (Gardiner 2017a).
A second, in some ways less harsh, diagnosis is that the current generation is 
driven by shallowness, and in particular a fragile and ultimately mistaken conception 
of self-interest that obscures better and deeper visions. (For instance, classic versions 
of this diagnosis emphasize an unhealthy emphasis on consumerism, fed by excessive 
and manipulative advertising.) According to the shallowness account, the tyranny of 
the contemporary is particularly tragic: shallow conventional values are genuinely 
self-destructive for us, as well as ruinous for others. If we would only embrace a better 
(deeper) set of values, we would again find ourselves in a “win-win” situation where 
green is good for all.
the shallowness diagnosis often fuels responses to environmental problems 
that advocate alternative “green” lifestyles that highlight the benefits to the current 
generation of pro-environmental behaviors (e.g., the health benefits of cycling and 
less meat-intensive diets). Moreover, the diagnosis encourages the (often implicit) op-
timistic thought that mere recognition of shallowness should constitute a large part 
of the cure. the current generation, the thought goes, should be highly motivated to 
seek solutions that enhance its well-being, understood in a suitably enlightened way.
Still, here too there are reasons to hesitate. For one thing, the shallowness ap-
proach threatens to presuppose very widespread, perhaps global, agreement on what 
people recognize to be good for them. Yet such agreement has, historically and philo-
sophically, been hard to come by. For another thing, even if agreement can be found, 
recognition of our true interests is often insufficient to ensure adequate action. We 
already frequently fail to do what is best for us, and for a multitude of reasons. (For 
example, often we fail to eat well and exercise.) Moreover, sometimes the reasons for 
not doing what is good for us are themselves fairly shallow: for example, often we 
are simply stuck in our ways, due perhaps to laziness, or complacency, or just being 
uncomfortable with change.
In my view, both ruthlessness and shallowness contribute to the tyranny of 
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the contemporary in the case of climate change. there are therefore good reasons 
to continue to pursue the associated “win-win” strategies to at least some extent. 
Nevertheless, I believe that a third driver is even more important: obliviousness. Here 
the charge is that conventional institutions are blind, or perhaps hostile, to intergen-
erational concern.
On this diagnosis, current people may have genuine intergenerational values, 
including around the strong need to protect future generations from the negative 
effects of phenomena such as climate change. However, current institutions lack the 
wherewithal with which to register such concern and drive it towards an appropriate 
impact on policy. Instead, intergenerational concern is largely invisible to existing 
institutions, or else swamped by other concerns. Consequently, even though people 
may have genuine intergenerational concern, existing institutions make it appear as 
if the assumption of generation-relative motivation were true. In other words, there is 
a profound institutional gap between the plausible values of the population and the 
forces that ultimately drive policy. Unless this gap can be filled, the tyranny looks set 
to run and run.
Some will doubt that the current generation has genuine intergenerational 
concern, or perhaps sufficient levels of such concern. though I am optimistic that 
they do, or can at least be roused so that they do, in the end this is an empirical matter. 
I will say that genuine intergenerational concern is needed if we are to overcome the 
moral problem posed by the tyranny of the contemporary in climate and other cases. 
In particular, even if the practical problem of climate change were resolved by showing 
that the interests of the current generation do in fact perfectly align with those of 
future generations (as the more mainstream responses to ruthlessness and shallow-
ness attempt to do), such a resolution would demonstrate only that the current gen-
eration is capable of pursuing its own interests more effectively in situations that turn 
out not to be true instances of the tyranny of the contemporary.
As I said above, in my view, overcoming the tyranny of the contemporary in a 
case like climate change will require both accepting responsibility for the future, and 
meeting the institutional gap. I will now propose that we approach the first (accept-
ing responsibility for the future) in terms of a traditional “delegated responsibility” 
model of the transmission of individual responsibility to collectives, and the second 
(meeting the institutional gap) with a call for a global constitutional convention 
focused on future generations.
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II. DELEGAtED RESPONSIbILItY MODEL
Let us begin with a basic sketch of the delegated responsibility model (DRM).
A basic Sketch
Individual agents have moral and political responsibilities.9 Many can be dis-
charged by individual action. However, others are best discharged collectively, in-
cluding a large number that can only be either fully, or successfully, or adequately 
discharged collectively. these include many paradigm cases of moral and political 
responsibility. In such cases, individuals have duties to cooperate with others to dis-
charge their (individual) responsibilities collectively. typically, this is done through a 
delegation of authority by the relevant individuals to a collectively-sanctioned insti-
tution. this then acts “in their name”. Notably, without delegation, the collective in-
stitution lacks authority, and the original responsibility remains with the individuals. 
Similarly, if a collectively-sanctioned institution is established but fails to discharge 
the relevant responsibilities, then responsibility returns to the individuals again, to 
either fix the institution, or to find some other way to discharge the responsibility 
(e.g., typically by setting up some new institution).
As I interpret it, the delegated responsibility model posits two levels of respon-
sibility. Call these ‘level 1’ (L1) and ‘level 2’ (L2). We might think of them as the origin 
level and the delegated (or discharged) level. On the delegated responsibility model, level 
1 (the origin level) is the individual level; level 2 (the delegated level) is the collective 
level. Hence, the idea of the DRM is that individual agents have L1 responsibility for 
action that they then delegate to another collectively-sanctioned agent (or agents) at 
L2, on the grounds that the L1 responsibilities are best discharged collectively.10 In 
paradigm cases, this is because they can only be either fully, or successfully, or ad-
equately, discharged collectively, though in practice it is often merely because they 
9.  For present purposes, I will not distinguish between these categories. Again, my hope is that 
my current argument is at a higher level of abstraction, and compatible with a wide variety of views 
about the relationship between these two categories. Moreover, while my own position suggests that 
they are tightly linked, the details do not seem critical to the general argument being offered here.
10.  Such L2 agents are typically collective agents, but may also be individuals (e.g., if the need for 
collective discharging rests on a need for joint authorization, rather than for a distinctively collective 
agent). In addition, such delegation need not imply (and usually does not) that individuals do not re-
tain some responsibilities at the individual level, nor does it imply that there are no new responsibili-
ties for individuals in light of the delegation. For example, individuals may have significant (residual 
and/or new) responsibilities as individuals to work to sustain L2 institutions.
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are most efficiently, or conveniently, discharged collectively (e.g., because doing so 
dramatically reduced transaction costs, because relevant institutions already exist 
for other purposes, etc.).11 the key point, however, is that collectively-authorized (L2) 
agents are empowered (and often also created) with level 2 responsibilities to dis-
charge the relevant set of level 1 responsibilities of individuals. Notably, the L2 agents 
take their authority from L1 agents, and so from individuals. Consequently, individu-
als remain responsible for their delegation of responsibility to L2. this is part of what 
it means to say that L2 agents act “in the name” of L1 agents.12 their authority is at the 
delegated level, and therefore must be understood in terms of the delegation from the 
individuals who have the initial authority at the origin level.
Status of the Model
before exploring the model, allow me to make three clarifications about its status. 
the first clarification is that although, on my understanding, the delegated responsi-
bility model is a traditional one in Anglo-American political philosophy, this is not 
to say that it is a secure model. there are many ways in which it may be challenged, 
some serious, for example by approaches such as Iris Marion Young’s (Young 2013). 
Ultimately, the model may yet prove philosophically unattractive, or practically un-
workable. Nevertheless, the DRM does have considerable explanatory power, both 
theoretically and when it comes to understanding a number of actual political prac-
tices. In what follows, rather than directly defending the model, I will focus on its 
explanatory power, with an emphasis on what the model might help us understand 
about global, intergenerational and ecological problems such as climate change.
the second clarification is that much of what I shall be arguing about the DRM 
is theoretically fairly modest, and should be of interest to a wide range of theorists of 
many different stripes. In particular, much of the explanatory power of the DRM is 
not undermined by deeper philosophical questions about the foundations and wider 
relevance of the model itself. to illustrate this, let me make two points.
11.  Sometimes the reason will be that although individual discharging would be the most effective 
approach, it conflicts with other priorities. For instance, individuals may find such action irksome 
(e.g., as in the complaint that “socialism would take too many evenings”).
12.  My distinction differs from Simon Caney’s contrast between first- and second-order respon-
sibilities for climate change, and addresses different issues (Caney 2014, pp. 10-13). For instance, 
Caney’s second-order responsibilities are (i) “responsibilities to ensure that agents comply with their 
first-order responsibilities”, and (ii) include responsibilities to allocate new first-order responsibilities 
to those who previously lacked them (Caney 2014, p. 13). by contrast, (my) level 2 responsibilities are 
not focused on ensuring compliance, nor do they concern allocating (my) level 1 responsibilities.
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First, accepting the DRM need not imply endorsing an underlying monism 
about responsibility. the DRM explains how a form of moral and political responsi-
bility works. It need not claim to cover all kinds of moral and political responsibility. 
For instance, one might accept the DRM only as one part of a more comprehensive, 
pluralistic account of responsibility.
Second, there is a clear reason to think that a more comprehensive account is 
needed. the DRM takes the relevant form of individual responsibility as primary, 
and the relevant collective responsibility as derivative. Still, there is a complication. 
the delegated responsibility model does not by itself determine from where the orig-
inal individual responsibility comes. It is a view about the relationship between (a form 
of) individual responsibility and (a form of) collective responsibility, not about the 
nature of (the relevant) individual responsibility itself. Consequently, it is compatible 
with a variety of views about the nature of the relevant individual responsibility.
the second point can be illustrated with two salient examples. One class of views 
takes the relevant sense of individual responsibility to rest on a prior individualistic 
account. For instance, some will likely claim that individuals assume responsibility (in 
a prior individualistic way) by expressly joining a group that is essentially constituted 
by a set of norms with the structure of the DRM model (e.g., some voluntary associa-
tion). On this kind of view, the individual responsibility that is primary within the 
DRM is (from a wider perspective) itself derivative from a prior individualistic model. 
So, though allowing for a derivative explanation, such views are “individualistic all 
the way down”.
Another class of views, however, will likely take the individual responsibility 
that is primary within the DRM to derive from a prior form of collective responsibility. 
So, for example, some will claim that one has individual responsibilities for ensur-
ing basic security in one’s own nation because one is a member of that nation (e.g., 
because one was born into it). Here, the primary responsibility from the point of view 
of the DRM is individual responsibility, but that individual responsibility is itself 
predicated on (a) group membership, and (b) an understanding of what it is to be a 
member of such a group that makes the DRM model and its invocation of individual 
responsibility appropriate. On such views, the individual responsibility cited by the 
DRM is in one sense a “conduit” between different forms of collective responsibility.
these examples show that, in terms of the terminology of levels, some views 
of responsibility will marry the DRM with a further view about the origins of level 1 
responsibility. Some of these will argue that their view justifies positing further levels 
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below L1 to account for this. Usually, this will be through the signaling of a ‘level zero’ 
(L0), though perhaps some will want to go deeper. Similarly, other views may elabo-
rate on the DRM by positing levels beyond level 2 (e.g., level 3, level 4). One reason 
that this more complex structure may emerge would be if it takes an initial delegation 
to a L2 entity for it to be understood that further institutional structure is needed 
but this does not replace the need for the initial L2 entity. For example, one might 
imagine the creation of a number of L2 entities at the local level, where this leads to 
a recognition that a national level institution is also needed, and in a way which does 
not involve a replacement of the L2 (local) entities, but rather a supplement at a new 
level 3.
My third and final clarification concerns my own background view. While most 
of the argument I will be giving relies only on a modest endorsement of the DRM, 
takes no position on more general or foundational issues, and so should be of interest 
to a wider range of theorists, it nevertheless seems wise, in the spirit of full disclosure, 
to signal that I am sympathetic to a rival position to those just mentioned, and one 
that takes the relevant individual responsibility to be primary in a stronger sense. 
Specifically, I take the relevant kind of individual responsibility to be foundationally 
sited in individuals simply in virtue of their moral agency. In other words, responsibility 
is not sited in individuals because (for example) they have acquired responsibility in 
other ways, such as through their choices, or being members of groups, or becoming 
entangled in various forms of other relationships, whether causal, moral or of some 
other kind. Instead, on the view I have in mind, agency itself has its price. A heavy 
part of this price is the assumption of agency responsibility, the sort of moral and 
political responsibility that one has simply in virtue of being a moral agent in the first 
place.
though I will not defend this approach in this paper, I will make two remarks 
to give a sense of where my version of the agency view is coming from and what mo-
tivates it. the first remark is that the agency view as I understand suggests a general 
outlook on humanity’s situation in dealing with a challenge like climate change. At 
the most fundamental level, we are seven billion (or so) individual agents who find 
ourselves together facing a common challenge on this planet that only we can address 
and in some sense must address together. On this outlook, our basic situation is one 
of “we’re all in this together (as agents)”.
to adopt this outlook is not to deny that, looked at conventionally, our existing 
agency is structured through countless historical and current social practices, and 
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these limit our actions in various complex ways. Nevertheless, in my view the basic 
situation remains. In particular, though the conventional structures are deeply so-
cially embedded and in many ways resilient to change (to good and bad effect), they 
retain much of their force due to our ongoing support of existing practices, support that 
is both practical and theoretical. In other words, the continued status (and therefore 
effects) of existing structures is largely contingent on our endorsement of them, as 
individuals and collectively. Consequently, a key part of the challenge facing us is 
how to understand their strengths and weaknesses, and what is at stake in changing 
them if they prove to be inadequate.
the second remark is that the “we’re in this together (as agents)” view fits into a 
broader starting-point that elsewhere I call the Perspective of Humanity (Cf. Gardiner 
2011b):
“The basic position of human individuals is that of members of a recently-evolved 
species on a small planet in an otherwise inhospitable solar system, amidst a vast, 
and currently unreachable universe. At present, the only viable (e.g., adequate, ac-
cessible) home for the human species and for all (known) others is the planet on 
which we reside. However, humans have attained unprecedented power over the 
planet, and now have the ability to influence profoundly the basic physical and eco-
logical systems that support life as we know it, and especially for the worse.”
In my view, this claim captures fundamental facts about our situation that must 
be respected by moral and political theories. these facts pose questions about how 
we are to understand ourselves and how we are to act. Moreover, it is natural to think 
that such questions are fundamental to social and political philosophy, in the sense 
that our responses to them frame and limit the answers we may give to other pressing 
social and political questions, such as how we are to live our own lives, and what we 
owe to contemporaries of our own species.
though I signal the view and the perspective, I will not pursue them in more 
detail here. Fortunately, I suspect that little of what I have to say in the rest of this 
paper depends on them, and that proponents of other views can still accept the 
DRM, and its explanatory value. Still, I signal these background positions to forestall 
certain kinds of questions – generally questions that ask why I am so strongly em-
phasizing the DRM, and not pursuing the topic in a way that proponents of the other 
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two classes of position may prefer or expect, since they believe they have “deeper” 
individualistic or collectivist accounts on which to draw.
III. ExPLANAtORY VALUE
Let us turn now to the explanatory value of the DRM. I will identify five areas 
where the DRM is illuminating: in explaining silence, unfamiliarity, inhibition, 
evasion and dystopia.
Silence
the first two areas (silence and unfamiliarity) involve a challenge that is often 
posed to responsibility in situations like climate change. In a general form, the chal-
lenge is memorably described by Dale Jamieson (1992, p. 149), who says:
“Today we face the possibility that the global environment may be destroyed, yet no 
one will be responsible. This is a new problem.”
Jamieson thinks that our ordinary conceptions of moral and political re-
sponsibility fail to find traction when it comes to global environmental problems. 
Commonsense morality and the theories that rely on it are puzzlingly silent on these 
important issues.
there are a number of reasons for Jamieson’s claim, and I discuss many of them 
extensively elsewhere (Gardiner 2011c; Jamieson 2013; Gardiner 2013). Here, however, 
I will focus on just one: the idea that commonsense morality faces deep difficul-
ties when serious ethical problems are created by us just “getting on with our lives” 
(Jamieson 2013, p. 42), or actions that are “usual” (Sinnott-Armstrong 2005). Jamieson 
glosses this point by saying (2014, p. 148):
“Most of the time we do not subject what people do to moral evaluation. This may 
be because we consider most of what people do to be “their business”, belonging to a 
private sphere that is beyond the reach of morality. Or it may be because we regard 
most of what people do to be permissible. … Various moral theorists would like to 
dislodge this way of seeing things, but nevertheless this is more or less how most of us 
see things most of the time.”
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In my view, one appeal of the DRM is that it has considerable explanatory power 
when it comes to making sense of the worries expressed by Jamieson and others13, yet 
without succumbing to the general skepticism about responsibility that some of their 
remarks suggest.14
Let us begin with the general challenge of ‘no one is responsible’. the DRM 
gives rise to two natural explanations of the ongoing policy failures with respect to 
climate change, and other intergenerational issues (Gardiner 2011c). According to the 
first, the DRM implies that level 2 (delegated) responsibility has been assigned to national 
governments. Although the initial level 1 (origin level) responsibility rests with individ-
uals, they have delegated authority to their national governments to deal with global 
environmental problems. However, national governments are failing to discharge 
their L2 responsibilities; hence, they are subject to (moral) criticism. Consequently, 
national governments must rise to the challenge, and individuals (because of their 
L1 responsibility) must urge them to do this. If this project fails (and arguably it has 
failed in the climate case, at least for a good part of the last 25 years), then the attempt 
to delegate responsibility has been unsuccessful. thus, we remain at L1, where indi-
viduals have the responsibility to find another way to solve the problem, presumably 
through another attempt to establish effective institutions. We might add that both 
individuals and national governments share in the responsibility for such failures, 
particularly insofar as failure was reasonably predictable, and especially if it was a 
calculated failure (e.g., for purposes of wasting time) (Gardiner 2004; 2011a).
According to the second natural explanation, the DRM implies that no one has 
been assigned level 2 (delegated) responsibility. On this view, national governments were 
not designed to deal with global, intergenerational, and ecological problems such as 
climate change. Hence, the assignment of responsibility to them is unwarranted, and 
13.  My claim is that the DRM provides one illuminating explanation. I do not claim that it is the 
only possible explanation, nor do I try (here) to defend it against alternatives.
14.  An anonymous reviewer objects (1) that Jamieson’s point is about moral responsibility, (2) that 
moral and political responsibility are “apples and oranges”, but (3) that my approach mixes moral 
and political responsibility to generate its explanatory power, and so (4) does not address Jamieson’s 
primary underlying concern, which the reviewer takes to be “precisely (a) that no single agent might 
be to blame for climate change and (b) that no agent might be clearly identifiable as morally respon-
sible”. I agree with at least some versions of (1) and (3), but do not think this is a problem, since I am 
not convinced by robust versions of (2). (Also, Jamieson explicitly objects to political responsibility 
as well in some places, so (1) is not as pertinent as it may initially appear.) In addition, as I understand 
it, my approach does address relevant versions of (4). Although the reviewer may be right that it does 
not do so within Jamieson’s framework as such (or the reviewer’s), I am not sure why that is a persua-
sive objection, rather than (say) an advantage of my (allegedly rival) framework.
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perhaps also unfair.15 (this view is the one that most resonates with Jamieson’s claim 
that “the global environment might be destroyed, yet no one will be responsible”.) 
According to the DRM, then, responsibility remains solely at level 1 (the origin level). 
Having proceeded no further, individuals bear responsibility, since no attempt to 
delegate was made, or all such attempts were unsuccessful, resulting in no level 2 as-
signment of responsibility at all. Either way, the level 1 responsibility remains.
In summary, taken together these two explanations seriously blunt the initial 
force of the general challenge. there is no theoretical mystery here; let alone one that 
presents a dramatically new problem for moral and political philosophy.16
Unfamiliarity
Let us turn then to the more specific version of the ‘no one is responsible’ worry: 
that climate change and problems like it fail to register with commonsense morality 
because they involve our “going about our everyday lives”, or indulging in merely 
“usual” actions or activities, or are insulated from moral criticism by a background 
social convention of most things not being morally accessible. Let me make three 
points in response.
the first point is that this worry appears to miss the mark, since the delegated 
responsibility model supplies a natural explanation. this explanation takes the form 
of an error theory. If we understand “going about our everyday lives” and the “usual” 
within the proper political context supplied by the DRM, the worry rests on a con-
fusion. Specifically, part of the point of the DRM is to assign delegated (level 2 and 
higher) responsibilities in ways that help to define “the usual”, including by partly 
determining the extent of our individual freedoms to “go about our everyday busi-
ness” without undue burdens. In other words, the notions of “the usual” and “going 
about our everyday lives” to which the objection appeals are not prior to the DRM and 
its delegation of L2 (and higher) responsibilities, but are instead bound up with that 
15.  though there is some truth to this claim, it should be noted that most political actors have 
acted as if the role did belong to them and they were competent to discharge it, rather than (for 
example) declaring to their constituencies that the topic was outside of their purview, or advocating 
for fundamentally new or different institutions. Given this, some responsibility remains (cf. Gardiner 
2011c).
16.  Does my account beg the question against Jamieson, since it presupposes that individuals 
have responsibility at L1? I think not. (At least, it does not beg the question any more than presup-
posing that there is no such responsibility.) As we shall see, most of the explanatory power comes 
from the DRM model as such, not from the simple assumption of individual responsibility. For in-
stance, the DRM provides a useful error theory as to why concerns about a lack of individual responsi-
bility might initially arise even if such responsibility is actually present. (See below.)
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assignment. Consequently, appeals to those notions are dubious in situations where 
the attempt to delegate has failed, including when no attempt to assign L2 responsi-
bilities has even been made.
the second point is that it is not clear that a more demanding account of indi-
vidual responsibility is so implausible, either at the level of the usual or more foun-
dationally. In fact, it seems that demanding ideals may already be there, lurking in 
background conceptions of how political responsibility is supposed to work.
Consider a more standard case than climate.17 Suppose there is a breakdown in 
basic security in a neighboring city in one’s own country. For example, suppose one 
lives in Sacramento and the security forces in San Francisco are wiped out in a ter-
rible terrorist attack. Who would have the responsibility to deal with it? Presumably, 
in the first instance it is the city and state governments, and (failing that) the govern-
ment of the United States. Why? On the delegated responsibility model, it is because 
they already have delegated authority to act “in our name” to ensure basic security. 
However, what if all these efforts to delegate fail? Would the rest of us be off the hook? 
On the delegated responsibility model, the obvious answer is ‘no’. Primarily, each of 
us would have some responsibility to try to get existing institutions to live up to the 
responsibilities delegated to them, and (if this turns out to be hopeless) to establish 
new ones to replace them.18 Secondarily, we would also have a responsibility not to 
thwart good efforts to achieve these goals, but to cooperate with them. For instance, 
we should not try to benefit from the lawlessness by sending in looting parties, or 
making deals with potential looters on the black market.
Would each of us also have a personal responsibility to “get armed and go West” 
in order to police the streets of San Francisco ourselves? In practice, I doubt that it 
would come to that. Uncoordinated individual action would be a pretty poor way 
of addressing the real problem, and come at a very high cost. If we got to the point 
where average individuals had seriously to consider packing rifles and flak jackets, 
an awful lot would have to have gone wrong. Moreover, there would also have to be 
a good chance of making a meaningful difference, and the prospects for better solu-
tions would have to be bleak.
Nevertheless, in principle, if all other efforts towards better solutions failed, and 
if we could plausibly make a real and positive difference, the idea of robust person-
17.  these next two paragraphs are adapted from Gardiner 2013.
18.  the wider burden may initially fall on Americans. However, under a number of circumstanc-
es the ‘us’ would extend to a wider global public.
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al responsibilities is not so strange, especially as a stop-gap measure until a better 
response could be put in place. Indeed, assumptions of personal responsibility are 
often made in such circumstances. For example, when communities develop re-
sponse plans for predictable disasters, such as earthquakes in high risk areas, they 
often assume that individuals must initially pick up the slack, at least until a more 
effective collective response can be made.
If this is correct, on a plausible interpretation of the delegated responsibility 
model, the reason that this kind of individual responsibility seems unfamiliar is not 
that there is a conceptual problem with individual responsibility, but that focusing on 
the individual’s personal behavior seems the wrong way to tackle the problem actu-
ally being faced, or at least so far down the list of serious options that it is a poor focus 
for action. Instead, in the cases with which we are most familiar political responsibil-
ity seems much more central.
Still, none of this implies that a demanding notion of individual personal re-
sponsibility is not already implicitly present in our lives, embedded in background 
assumptions about the way our society is supposed to work, and so, in a sense, con-
stituting one part of the “usual”. On the contrary, though normally “invisible” in 
daily life, robust forms of personal responsibility do persist in many contemporary 
societies as an important part of their organizational structure. Common examples 
include: jury duty, the draft, mandatory national service, and so on. Consequently, 
such responsibility is in fact more visible than the initial objection acknowledges. 
Severe circumstances expose it more clearly to the light, but they do not create a 
“new” problem.
the third point is that the feeling of unfamiliarity is predictable, especially in 
cases where delegation is perceived to be highly effective in other domains of life 
(Gardiner 2011c). In particular, some who endorse the DRM will also hold wider con-
ceptions of political philosophy that embed a familiar socio-political ideal. According 
to this ideal, effective institutions should discharge as many ethical responsibilities 
as possible for citizens, so that individuals do not have to worry about such respon-
sibilities, but become maximally free to engage in their own pursuits (subject to ex-
ternal constraints set out by the system). However, on this ideal, success tends to 
breed elimination of responsibility in personal life. Consequently, the more effective 
a social system is (or is perceived to be) at discharging responsibilities in general, the 
more demanding any significant unmet responsibilities will seem. In other words, 
for those used to broad freedoms to pursue their own ends without worrying about 
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wider responsibilities, the emergence of a serious failure to discharge is likely to be 
deeply jarring: the issues will seem very unfamiliar and the nature of the responsibili-
ties extreme. Yet this may say more about the past successes of the DRM than current 
or future failures.
We can conclude that the DRM seems highly effective in countering the initial 
force of the “no one is responsible” and “getting on with our lives” objections. Still, 
there is more to be said. the DRM has additional explanatory force when it comes to 
understanding other obstacles to action. the issue of L2 assignment of responsibili-
ties raises several uncomfortable possibilities. In many circumstances, actors will be 
tempted to take advantage of the DRM in a variety of (often interconnected) ways. 
Sadly, this temptation appears especially salient in the case of climate and other global 
and intergenerational responsibilities, when the threat of moral corruption is high.
Inhibiting
Let us begin with the thought that a lack of level 2 responsibility assignment, or 
at least of effective assignment, will be highly convenient for some actors in some cir-
cumstances. Suppose, for instance, that some actors do not want to see some problem 
solved. (these actors can include both L1 agents and L2 agents established for other 
purposes, such as discharging other L1 duties.) the DRM suggests several ways 
of inhibiting or disrupting the process so that effective delegation does not occur. 
Consider just three likely strategies.
We might call the first strategy ‘internal structural sabotage’. Actors may ma-
nipulate specific L2 responsibility assignments in the relevant domain so that they 
are ineffective. For instance, they may facilitate agreements that are highly voluntary, 
with weak incentives, accountability and enforcement mechanisms. For example, in 
the climate case, consider the structure of the Kyoto Protocol and the initial form of 
the Paris Agreement (Gardiner 2004; 2011a).
the second strategy is ‘external structural sabotage’. Actors may arrange L2 
responsibility assignments for other issues in such a way as to create powerful L2 
agents in those (other) domains that oppose effective L2 assignments in the area in 
which they wish to prevent action. For instance, L2 actors from other domains (such 
as national governments or corporations) may prevent collective organization from 
forming in the relevant area (e.g., global environmental protection), they may ensure 
that any new L2 actors are so weak that they cannot perform their function (e.g., the 
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UNFCCC), or they may work to undermine those actors once they are in place (e.g., 
by establishing international trade agreements that prevent trade sanctions, and so 
inhibit strong environmental regulation).
We might call the third strategy, ‘smokescreen’. Actors may create “shadow so-
lutions” that present dangerous illusions of progress that serve mainly to distract at-
tention and political will from more effective action. Elsewhere I argue that this is a 
sadly plausible concern about much of the history of international climate policy (Cf. 
Gardiner 2004; 2011a).
Evasion
the fourth area where the delegated responsibility model has explanatory value 
is when it comes to what we might call ‘the problem of evasion’, where existing actors 
aim to make certain claims on them disappear. For one thing, they may manipulate 
L2 responsibility assignments so that they are simply absolved. A live example of this 
in the climate case would be the tendency for actors perpetually to push deadlines 
for action into the further political future, beyond the political lifetimes of the actors 
currently responsible (Cf. Gardiner 2011a, chapters 3-4). For another thing, existing 
actors may manipulate the basic understanding of L1 responsibility so that even the 
claim of responsibility disappears. One specific strategy that seems highly effective is 
that of acting as if L2 assignments (including categories and agents) are fundamental, 
and thereby rendering L1 responsibility invisible. A more common strategy perhaps 
is for states in particular to oscillate between (a) invoking a conventional DRM for 
global affairs quite generally, (b) protesting that they are trying but defeated by the 
bad intentions of other L2 actors, yet (c) arguing that they do not have a specific L2 
responsibility in this area, and are not particularly capable of solving the problem. In 
this “cunning wheeze”, most (or at least most powerful existing L2 agents) bemoan 
the general situation, blame everyone else, and quietly enjoy the benefits of the status 
quo. No one takes the vital steps of loudly (d) urging that the key issue might be the 
need for new institutions, or (e) insisting on the persistence of our L1 responsibilities 
in the absence of such institutions.
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Dystopia
Fifth, the delegated responsibility model also has explanatory value in under-
standing wider dystopia. A natural objection to the idea of lingering L1 responsibility 
at the individual level is that it seems deeply unrealistic and unfair in the world as 
we currently find it. Most people living ordinary lives are likely to protest: “How can 
it be my fault? In our world, I cannot be said to have any individual authority that 
is delegated or even respected. Others have the power, not me.” Jamieson himself 
may make a robust version of this claim when he says in passing: “[H]uman action 
is the driver, but it seems that things, not people, are in control … Our corporations, 
governments, technologies, institutions and economic systems seem to have lives of 
their own” (Jamieson 2014, p. 1).
the DRM can explain the force of this alienation of the individual from respon-
sibility at L1: other actors (L1 and/or L2) have inhibited the individual’s ability to dis-
charge his or her normal L1 responsibilities, through blocking L2 delegation for that 
agent, perhaps in multiple areas. In such cases, the fact that many individuals leading 
ordinary lives feel powerless may be no accident. In extreme scenarios, others have so 
arranged the social world that they have usurped power and thereby effective respon-
sibility for these issues from such individuals. On my agency responsibility account 
(as on many others), this counts as a central moral and political wrong. Notably, the 
DRM does a reasonable job of describing how that wrong can be understood.
Our discussion so far has suggested that the DRM has considerable explana-
tory power, both in theoretical terms and when it comes to the real world example of 
climate change. It remains to ask what the implications of this discussion are for what 
is to be done.
IV. A GLObAL CONStItUtIONAL CONVENtION
We have identified three major roots of the tyranny of the contemporary: ruth-
lessness, shallowness and obliviousness. the third and in my view most serious – 
obliviousness – rests on an institutional gap when it comes to registering and acting 
on intergenerational concern, and possibly also an implicit hostility of existing institu-
tions designed with very different and conflicting aims. the DRM delivers an initial 
account of how we should understand our responsibilities in light of this gap, and the 
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agency responsibility view provides one kind of more specific understanding of the 
structure of those responsibilities.
A natural upshot of this diagnosis of the problem is that individuals retain L1 
(origin level) responsibilities to come together to support (i.e., create and sustain19) 
new L2 (delegated level) institutions that will effectively fill the institutional gap, and 
do so in a way that is appropriately integrated with other aspects of agency (such as 
institutions with different L2 responsibilities (or higher) as well as other individual 
responsibilities at L1). Questions then arise as to what the new institutions would 
look like, how they would fit into such a revised system of agency, and how to develop 
an achievable path towards both. Such questions would be demanding enough even 
if we had robust theories to guide us. However, our task is made more difficult by the 
fact that this is not so: we do not know in advance precisely what the best, or even ad-
equate, versions of appropriate institutions or a revised system of agency would look 
like. Instead, we must proceed largely without such knowledge. Rather than straight-
forwardly applying robust theories, we must instead forge an ethics of the transition 
that moves us towards a better world without knowing in advance the precise desti-
nation (Gardiner 2011a).
Understanding the Proposal
In this context, my proposal is that we should initiate a call for a global consti-
tutional convention focused on future generations.20 Let me explain. by ‘we’ here, I 
mean existing agents with responsibilities at L1, L2 and other levels, including con-
cerned individuals, interested community groups, national governments and trans-
national organizations. by ‘initiating a call’, I intend the procedural suggestion that 
we should (a) provoke and promote a call to action, that (b) seeks to engage a range of 
actors, that is based on (c) a claim that they have or should take on a set of responsi-
bilities, and (d) a view about how to go about discharging those responsibilities. by “a 
global constitutional convention”, I have in mind a constitutional convention akin to 
that convened in Philadelphia in 1787 “to address the problems of the weak central 
government that existed under the Articles of Confederation”, and which led to the 
19.  Among other things, the reference to sustaining makes clear that there may, and in most cases 
are likely to be, further and residual responsibilities for individuals even given the delegation to new 
institutions.
20.  the next three paragraphs draw on Gardiner 2014. Other proposals for intergenerational 
institutions tend to be focused on nation-states (e.g., Read 2012; Gonzalez-Ricoy and Gosseries 2016).
Journal of Practical Ethics
 STEPHEN GARDINER44
establishment of the US Constitution and the structure of federal government that 
persists to this day.21 Our global constitutional convention would be convened to 
address the institutional gap surrounding concern for the future. Insofar as possible 
and prudent, it would do so without unnecessarily prejudging the outcome, whether 
in form or content.
the key components of my convention proposal can be understood in standard 
ways, as follows. First, I understand a convention to be “a representative body called 
together for some occasional or temporary purpose” and “constituted by statute to 
represent the people in their primary relations”. Second, the purpose of the conven-
tion is to establish a constitutional system in the minimal sense of “a set of norms (rules, 
principles or values) creating, structuring, and possibly defining the limits of, gov-
ernment power or authority.” third, the instigating role of the convention would be 
to discuss, develop, make recommendations toward, and set in motion a process for 
the establishment of such a constitution. Fourth, the convention would take as its 
primary subject matter the need to adequately reflect and embody intergenerational 
concern, including through the protection of future generations, the promotion of 
their interests (e.g., their rights, claims, welfare, etc.), the discharging of earlier gen-
erations’ duties with respect to them, and so on.
I take this proposal to have several attractive features. to begin with, it is based 
in a deep political reality. It responds to the seriousness of climate change, and to per-
sistent political inertia surrounding more modest initiatives. It calls attention to the 
heart of the problem (e.g., the failures of the current system, the need for an alterna-
tive, and the background issue of responsibility). It acknowledges that climate is only 
one instance of the tyranny of the contemporary, and we should expect others over 
the coming decades and centuries.22 Moreover, though the proposal is ambitious, it is 
not alienating. Not only does it not succumb to despair, but it also does not needless-
ly polarize from the outset (e.g., by leaping to specific recommendations about filling 
the institutional gap). In addition, it acknowledges the existence of fundamental dif-
ficulties and anxieties, but uses them to start the right kind of debate, rather than to 
foreclose it. As such, in my view it is a promising candidate to serve as the subject of 
a wide, overlapping political consensus, at least among those with intergenerational 
21.  https://history.state.gov/milestones/1784-1800/convention-and-ratification
22.  Within the perfect moral storm analysis, my focus is on global, intergenerational and ecologi-
cal instantiations of the storm. However, the intergenerational aspect, represented here through the 
tyranny of the contemporary, can also manifest itself independently of these other features of the 
perfect moral storm.
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concern. We might then turn to more specific conceptions of how to develop the pro-
posal for a global constitutional convention that seek to support, refine and build on 
such a consensus. I have more to say about that project elsewhere.23 For now, in order 
to clarify the basic proposal, let us turn to three initial objections.
World Government?
One obvious initial objection to the proposal is that it is an overt appeal for an 
extremely powerful, highly centralized and overarching “world government” that 
would effectively subsume all other forms of government. Many appear to find the 
idea of this kind of centralized authority disturbing and perhaps outright offensive. 
However, whatever one thinks on this question, it is a misreading of my proposal to 
think that it mandates “world government” understood in this way.
the purpose of the convention is to consider how to establish “a set of norms 
(rules, principles or values) creating, structuring, and possibly defining the limits of, 
government power or authority.” the proposal for a global constitutional conven-
tion itself aims, as far as is possible and prudent, not to prejudge the outcome of 
that deliberation. It certainly does not presuppose that a highly-centralized world 
government would emerge. Indeed, it envisions that a central question facing the 
convention itself will be how to develop a broader system of institutions and prac-
tices than is currently in place, that will, on the one hand, be capable of and likely 
to produce effective action (and so reflect some desirable features of a powerful and 
highly centralized global authority), but also, on the other hand, allow for the signifi-
cant preservation of existing institutions to serve as a bulwark against the excesses 
of any newly created ones (e.g., by neutralizing the standing threats posed by any new 
bodies, through methods such as the traditional separation of powers, “anti-power”, 
etc.). How this question is answered is not seriously prejudged merely by proposing a 
global constitutional convention to address it.
Undemocratic?
A second initial objection is that a global constitutional convention and any in-
stitutions that might flow from it would be inherently undemocratic (or, more neu-
trally, politically illegitimate or unrepresentative), especially because they would un-
23.  See Gardiner (2014) for discussion of guidelines for the global constitutional convention.
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dermine the sovereignty of conventional nation states, and thereby obstruct the will 
of current peoples.
As a theoretical objection, this worry strikes me as misguided. In particular, it 
appears to get things backwards. the motivating idea for the global constitutional 
convention is that there is an existing institutional gap that itself leads to an inappropriate 
and undemocratic global system. Consider three essential points.
First, according to my diagnosis, people’s legitimate intergenerational concerns 
are currently not being appropriately signaled or represented by current institutions. 
therefore, the DRM implies that the current system is defective and that we have a 
responsibility to address this defect.
Second, part of the problem is that current institutions, designed for other (L2) 
purposes, risk usurping the role that should be played by good intergenerational insti-
tutions. they therefore obstruct effective responsibility assignment (from L1 to L2) 
by individuals, impede the moral project of responsible agency for such individu-
als, and thereby undermine their own (L2) authority. Consequently, the real threat 
to democratic values here is that current institutions threaten to confound the “will of the 
people” properly understood. As a result, and contrary to the initial objection, success-
fully filling the institutional gap (with new or adjusted L2 institutions) would improve 
the political legitimacy of the overall institutional order. It would pay due respect to 
concerns that current (as well as past and future) people have but which are underap-
preciated and often thwarted by existing arrangements. In particular, to the extent 
that the sovereignty of nation states as currently organized illegitimately impedes 
such concerns, some adjustment to that sovereignty may be necessary.
third, more generally, the objection requires further elaboration. One concern 
is that it presupposes a monolithic view of sovereignty – that the people must have 
just one, all-powerful representative (or L2 agent), and this must be the nation state—
that is unattractive and runs counter to many existing systems and practices. though 
neither the DRM nor the global constitutional convention proposal rule out such 
a monolithic structure, they also do not assume that one is required. Instead, they 
allow for the possibility of more pluralistic models, whereby individuals may delegate 
their L1 responsibilities to a number of institutions at L2 (or higher). these may be 
distinct entities, or overlapping, or related in other complicated ways. they may be 
further unified in a monolithic overarching structure, but they may not. Importantly, 
often there are reasons to discourage too much unity, such as when there is a need for 
checks and balances. For example, federal systems such as the United States divide 
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responsibilities within the federal government, and also between the federal govern-
ment and state and local authorities. Each institution in the system is seen as a legitimate 
representative of the people, often responsible for distinct but overlapping L2 responsi-
bilities. None is seen as compromising the “sovereignty of the people” simply in virtue 
of its existence, nor merely because it may sometimes come into conflict with other 
L2 institutions. Instead, each institution represents some legitimate aspect of the will 
of the people (and their L1 responsibilities), and has its own legitimate sphere of influ-
ence, including when that sphere overlaps with the spheres of other L2 institutions.
Unfeasible?
A third initial objection is that the proposal for a global constitutional conven-
tion is (perhaps laughably) unfeasible given the world as we currently know it, and 
especially on a time frame relevant to successfully addressing a problem like climate 
change. I have a number of responses.
Let us begin with the specific concern about the time-frame. First, it is worth 
noting that, as serious as the climate problem is, the proposal for a global constitu-
tional convention is aimed not just, or even primarily, at climate change, but at a much 
wider challenge of which climate change is but one instance (i.e., the tyranny of the 
contemporary in particular, and the perfect moral storm more generally). Hence, the 
proposal would have an important purpose even if it did not contribute to solving the 
climate problem, but instead helped to forestall further intergenerational problems 
in the future.
Second, the proposal is not intrinsically antagonistic to other processes that 
might help in the climate (or other) cases, and may even facilitate such processes. For 
instance, enthusiasts for the current Paris Agreement may still continue to support 
the existing UNFCCC process as part of a two-track approach, where one track is the 
UNFCCC and the other is the global constitutional convention. Indeed, in my view 
progress on the global constitutional convention promises to make substantial action 
within the UNFCCC process more likely and more robust.
third, we should be evenhanded and compare proposals on a level playing field. 
In particular, if the timeframe is an issue, one should not forget that the main rivals 
to the proposal for a global constitutional convention have not so far proved quick 
at producing action. In the climate case, the UNFCCC process has already taken 
more than 20 years. (Recall Mary Robinson’s observation that “global negotiations 
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have proceeded at a glacial pace”.) Moreover, many continue to criticize the current 
ambition and structure of the Paris agreement, calling its approach much too modest, 
and pressing for further evolution over the next decade or so (Cf. Oxfam et al. 2015; 
Anderson and Peters 2016). At the time of writing (November 2016), the recent elec-
tion of the trump Administration in the United States has underlined the fragility 
of the Paris approach.
Still, fourth, and most importantly, we should question the implicit assumption 
that the call for a global constitutional convention necessarily involves a commitment 
to a very long process. For instance, the US constitutional convention took place 
over only a few months, and its recommendations were ratified and implemented 
within a few years. With real political will, and the sense that a global constitutional 
convention may actually produce effective institutions, similarly fast results may be 
achieved even allowing for the necessary due deliberation.
this brings us to broader issues of feasibility. Again, I will make just a few 
points. First, we should recognize that notions of political feasibility are often highly 
treacherous. In my lifetime, many things said to be politically infeasible (the fall of the 
berlin Wall, the peaceful collapse of Apartheid in South Africa, the election of the 
first black US President) have come to pass, and on a timescale far shorter than main-
stream understandings of political reality would allow. As some people like to say, 
sometimes one reaches social and political “tipping points”. After decades of relative 
inaction, we may be getting closer to one on climate and this may facilitate the pro-
posal for a global constitutional convention. this may be so even if in the short-term 
the prospects for robust action become more bleak. Such deadlock may make the 
institutional problem even clearer.
Second, evenhandedness in comparing proposals is an issue here as well. For 
instance, the main alternative proposal to emerge recently is that of geoengineer-
ing—grand technological interventions into the global climate system, such as 
stratospheric sulfate injection (‘SSI’). Notably, the pursuit of SSI is often motivated 
under the idea that a back up plan or ‘Plan b’ is needed in case conventional climate 
negotiations fail, or do not deliver action quickly enough (Fragniere and Gardiner 
2016). Yet the ‘back up plan’ rationale seems to provide at least as much reason to 
push for a global constitutional convention, especially as it is arguably more socially 
and technically achievable.
to push this point home, we might note that the ‘back up plan’ rhetoric for geo-
engineering remains curiously popular even when it comes to promoting “magical” 
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technologies: technologies that do not yet exist, and are not very close to existing, es-
pecially on the scale needed. Some critics, for example, complain that current IPCC 
pathways towards 2 degrees Celsius “require massive deployment of biomass Energy 
with Carbon Capture and Storage (bECCS)”, when there is “a distinct lack of evi-
dence to determine whether bECCS is technically feasible, economically afford-
able, environmentally benign, socially acceptable and politically viable at a material 
scale” (Kruger et al. 2016). Moreover, elsewhere I argue that there is no escape from 
the institutional questions: even minimally decent forms of geoengineering (and also 
many indecent but perhaps morally tolerable forms) will also require significant in-
stitutional reform of the kind that the global constitutional convention is intended 
to address (Gardiner 2011a).
the third point about broad feasibility is that the proposal for a global consti-
tutional convention at least has the virtues of highlighting the depths of the current 
structural problems, challenging us to confront them directly in an appropriately 
serious venue, and yet being comparatively open and initially minimalist about the 
precise content of what should emerge. Moreover, critically, the real obstacles that 
would need to be overcome are those likely to arise for any proposal that may actually 
make a crucial difference. Consequently, while we should acknowledge that deep pessi-
mism about the proposal for a global constitutional convention is easy to understand, 
especially in the face of the tyranny of the contemporary and other lurking defects of 
current institutions, we cannot afford to give in to it. the key issues highlighted by 
the proposal for a global constitutional convention are just those that must be addressed 
if we are to confront the challenge that faces us, and so discharge our responsibilities.
V. CONCLUSION
I have argued that we face an ongoing failure of the global political system in 
dealing with paradigmatically global, intergenerational and ecological problems, such 
as climate change. Existing institutions tend to crowd out intergenerational concern, 
and thereby encourage the live threats of a tyranny of the contemporary and a cor-
ruption of the discourse. though such threats have several sources, I focused on the 
institutional gap around the issue of registering intergenerational concern.
My general approach has been to say that meeting these threats will require both 
accepting responsibility for the future and filling in the institutional gap. In order 
to understand the first (accepting responsibility), I proposed a traditional delegated 
Journal of Practical Ethics
 STEPHEN GARDINER50
responsibility model of the transmission of individual responsibility to collectives. I 
then developed the delegated responsibility model by suggesting how it leads us to 
understand both past failures and prospective responsibility. For the second (filling 
the institutional gap), I proposed that the current generation should take responsibil-
ity by initiating a call for a global constitutional convention focused on concern for 
future generations. I then briefly defended this proposal, in part by rejecting three 
initial objections, that the proposal is an overt call for heavily centralized world gov-
ernment, that it is inherently undemocratic, and that it is unfeasible. though my pro-
posal is only a first step and requires further discussion, my current aim is simply to 
open that important debate.24
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